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FOREWORD 
This Collaborative Paper is one of a series embodying the  outcomes 
of a workshop and conference on Economic g t m c t u ~ a l  Change: Analytical 
Issues, held a t  IlASA in July and August of 1983. The conference and  
workshop formed part  of the continuing IIASA program on Pat terns  of 
Economic Structural  Change a n d  Industrial Adiustment. 
Structural  change was in te rpre ted  very broadly: the topics covered 
included the  na tu re  and  causes of changes in different sectors  of the 
world economy, the relationship between international markets  and 
national economies, and issues of organization and  incentives in large 
economic systems. 
There is a general consensus t h a t  important economic s t ructural  
changes a re  occurring in t h e  world economy. There are ,  however, 
several alternative approaches t o  measuring these changes, to modeling 
the  process, and to devising appropriate responses in t e rms  of policy 
measures  and  institutional redesign. Other interesting questions con- 
cern  the  role of the international economic system in transmitting such 
changes, and  the  meri ts  of alternative modes of economic organization 
in responding t o  s t ructural  change. All of these issues were addressed by 
participants i n  the  workshop and  conference, and  will be the focus of the 
continuation of the  research program's work. 
Geoffrey Heal 
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
Erno Zalai 

INNOVATION, PRODUCTnTrrY GROWTH, 
AND SI'RUCTURAL CHANGE 
Institute for the Theory, Organization, and History of Science, 
Academy of Sciences of the GDR, Prenzlauer Promenade 149-152, 
1100 Berlin, GDR 
This paper is concerned with three broad topics: first, changes in the 
conditions for productivity growth during the last decade; second, indus- 
trial innovation as a factor of productivity growth; and third, produc- 
tivity as a factor of structural change. A considerable amount of 
research has been done on each of these areas, particularly through the 
work of IIASA's Innovation Task from 1978 to 1982. This unique team 
included researchers from the Soviet Union, the United States, the GDR, 
the FRG, Austria, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and 1 hope that some of 
its work will be continued in the new IIASA program on Economic Struc- 
tural  Change. 
In recent  times, two main processes have had a marked effect on 
structural change in both the world economy and also in individual 
national economies: 
1. The radical change in the resource situation during the seventies: 
the  most significant results of tfiis change are an upward reva!ua- 
tion of natural resources and a relative devaluation of existing pro- 
ducts and technologies. 
2. The emergence of a new combination of productive forces, made up 
of such basic innovations as microelectronics, information technol- 
ogy, flexible automation, new energy options, modern biotechnology, 
and new materials. 
Under the pressure of the  altered resource situation, this new combina- 
tion of basic innovations is likely to trigger off a radical innovation push 
in the  next few years that will produce a new global economic structure 
with a qualitatively higher level of productivity. The revaluation of 
natural resources and devaluation of existing products and technologies 
is the  reason for the current "revolution in value," to use the terminol- 
ogy of Karl Marx, which is deeply influencing structural change 
throughout the economies of the world. 
Figure 1 shows the development of this "revolution in value" during 
the last ten years for oil, for other primary raw materials, and for 
manufactured goods. The increase in the relative value of natural 
resources is demonstrated by the  movement of real prices for oil 
(currently the main primary energy resource, accounting for 42% of glo- 
bal supplies), which were ten times higher in 1983 than in 1973. (Corn- 
pare, for example, the corresponding increase of only 30.5% over the 
entire preceding decade.) The decline in the relative value of 
manufactured goods and production technologies is refiected in the fact 
that standardized products are currently a t  their lowest price levels for 
thirty years. I t  is well known that  today i t  is almost impossible for the 
producers of machine engineering based on traditional electronics to 
make any profit on the world market. On the other hand, producers of 
machine engineering who have been able to incorporate the achieve- 
ments of modern microelectronics into their products have been 
rewarded with very high growth rates in both production and value 
added. 
Table 1 shows the very high growth rates for manufactured goods 
that are heavily dependant on microelectronics. For the second and 
third generations of industrial robots, the average annual growth rate 
was 34% from 1972 till 1980. Average annual growth rates for other fields 
were 56% for computerized NC machines, 69% for computer aided design 
(CAD), 40% for computer aided manufacturing (CAM), and 30% for flexible 
manufacturing systems. 
Currently, the growth of value per unit of natural resources is one 
hundred times higher in the newer, microelectronics-based areas of 
machine engineering than in traditional parts of the industry. This 
simultaneous revaluation of natural resources and devaluation of exist,- 
ing products and technologies has so far been dominant over the oppos- 
ing effects of the emerging new combination of basic innovations, which 
will tend to restructure the world economy and increase the growth of 
productivity. This is the reason why productivity growth rates in all the 
industrial countries have been declining in recent years (see Table 2). 
The present decline in productivity growth rates, which is of course 
not conducive to equalizing productivity levels worldwide, cannot. be 
explained simply in terms of the  absolute levels of productivity reached. 
Instead, we need to look for other fundamental factors that  tend to pro- 
duce similar effects in all countries, regardless of their level of develop- 
ment. From the historical point of view, we can point to the fact that  the 
potential for increased efficiency created through the basic innovation of 
the forties and fifties has been largely exhausted; from the standpoint of 
the present there appears to have been a lack of basic innovation in 
recent years to  launch a new wave of productivity growth. The most 
important growth industries of the last thirty years have been chemi- 
cals, electrical engineering, automobiles, plastics, petroleum products, 
and aircraft. The basic innovations that  were the driving forces of pro- 
ductivity growth during the fifties and sixties are shown in Table 3. One 
of the main features of basic innovations is that production units using 
them are able to achieve higher productivity growth rates than those 
working with traditional technologies. But these growth rates begin to 
decline as soon as the potential for greater efficiency is absorbed. Figure 
2 shows the development of the efficiencies of the main growth industries 
in the FRG during the fifties and sixties, and their tendency to decline in 
the seventies. Similar developments over this period can also be 
observed for the the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union, and the GDR. 
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Figure 1 Price changes on the world market for manufactured goods, oil, and 
other primary raw materials. 1963-1982. (Source: Financial k e s ,  October 11, 
1982.) 
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Future productivity growth will depend very heavily on the ability of 
society to utilize new basic innovations, which will emerge over the next 
two decades from the following areas: 
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Table 1 Basic innovations of flexible automation. 
Innovation Year first Length of World growth rates (7.) 
commer- take-off 
cialized (years) 1972-80 1980-90 
(forecast) 
NC-machine 1955 17 35 20-30 
Industrial robot 1962 10 44 25-30 
Computer-aided 
design (CAD) 1965 7 69 40-50 
CNC-machine 1969 3 56 40-45 
Computeraided 
manufacturing 
(CAN, DNC) 1967 5 40 30-35 
Flexible manu- 
facturing (FM) 1969 3 30 35-45 
Table 2 Industrial productivity growth rates in major developed countries, 
1963- 198 1. 
IPGR Change in Change in IPGR 
IPGR OGR 
Runned 
USSR 5.6 4.8 -0.8 -1.4 3.5 2.0 2.8 3.2 
Poland 5.9 8.0 2.1 3.6 4.8 2.9 1.0 -10.1 
GDR 5.3 5.3 0 -0.3 4.2 4.0 4.5 4.3 
CSSR 5.4 5.6 0.2 -0 .7 4.1 3.3 3.2 1.8 
Hungary 4.6 6.3 1 .7 -0.2 5.2 4.3 1.2 4.1 
Bulgaria 6.7 6.7 0 -4.3 6.4 4.2 2.9 2.8 
Romania 7.0 7.8 0.8 0.1 6.8 5.8 3.9 2.6 
Mmke t 
USA 2.1 1.0 -1.1 -3.5 1.8 2.0 -1.0 2.9 
Japan 8.9 3.7 -5.2 -9.5 6.3 8.4 4.9 0 
FRG 5.3 3.6 -1.7 -4.4 0.8 4.7 0.8 0.7 
France 5.2 4.0 -1.2 -3.4 3.4 5.3 1.3 -2.4 
UK 3.9 1.3 -2.6 -3.6 1.4 1.2 -3.7 5.7 
Canada 3.6 0.8 -2.8 -4.4 6.2 0.4 -1.6 1.2 
Italy 5.6 0.8 -4.8 -4.1 3.2 -6.3 5.0 0 
Sources: Monthly Bulletin o j  Sal is t ics ,  United Nations, New York, October 1982; 
Satistische Jakbticher dst Mtgliedsldinder des RGW, Moscow (in Russian). 
1. The electronics complex, including flexible automation, telecom- 
munication.~, office automation, and computerization of all spheres 
of the production process. 
Table 3 Basic innovations that drove productivity growth during the fifties and 
sixties. 
Degree of Industry 
impact 
Innovation (year) 
Complete Plastics 
Petrochemical 
Aircraft engineering 
Plexiglass (1935), neoprene 
(1931), perlon (1938), 
polyethylene silicone 
(1946). crease-resistant 
fabrics (1932), terylene 
flbers, water-resistant 
cellophane (1936), ball- 
point pens (1938) 
Catalytic petrol separation, 
anti-knock petrol (1935) 
Radar (1934), rockets 
(1935), helicopter (1930). 
jet engine (1941) 
Heavy Chemicals 
Electrotechnology 
Insulin (1922). kodachrome 
(1935), penicillin (1941), 
streptomycin (1944), deter- 
gent (1928). tungsten carbide 
(1926) 
Radio (1922), synthetic 
polarizer (1938), fluorescent 
lamps (1934), television 
(1936), tape recorder (1937), 
cine camera (1953) 
Automobile engineering Power steering (1930), 
hydraulic clutch (1937), 
automatic gearbox (1938) 
Precision tool making Giro compass (1909), zip 
fastener (1932) 
Marginal Polygraphic Xerography (1950) 
Iron and steel Continuous warm rolling 
(1923), continuous steel 
casting (1948) 
2. The energy complex. 
3. Modern biotechnology. 
4. Appropriate technologies for the industrialization of the developing 
countries. 
5. Social and technical innovations in the fields of human settlement,  
communication, health care, and relaxation. 
- Electrical engineering 
- Chemicals 
-- Manufacturing industry 
-- Petrochemicals 
- Plastics 
-.-- Aircraft 
.....--..... Average (all industries) 
Kgure 2 Labor productivity in various branches of industry in the FRG. 
1950-1977. 
One of the most  important influences on productivity growth will be 
microelectronics. Figure 3 clearly shows tha t  those industries tha t  a r e  
closely influenced by microelectronics have significantly higher levels of 
productivity growth than the average. 
Future productivity will depend very much on the  creation of a new 
potential for grea ter  efficiency through the  basic innovation carried out 
now. But there  are many reasons why production units show a strong 
tendency to  follow policies of improvement and  incremental innovation 
ra ther  than actively supporting basic innovation. Table 4 lists some of 
the  factors tha t  support this atti tude a t  the  level of the  individual Arm. 
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- Manufacture of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment 
-.- Electrical engineering' 
--- Plastic procasing 
.... -- .... Printing 
- Automobiles 
-- Manufacture of mechanical engineering machinery 
'Includes manufacture of electronic data processing (EDP) equipment 
Figure 3 Relative efficiencies of various branches of industry in the FRG in terms 
of labor productivity. 1970-1980. (Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics and own 
calculations.) 
However, recognizing and countering the  short-run pressures on 
firms to pursue improvement or  incremental innovation policies is only 
part of the solution. To achieve the  right balance between improvement 
and basic innovation within a given production uni t  or national economy 
we must  improve our understanding of the  relationship between innova- 
tion and efficiency. lnnovation is not a goal in itself, and i t  is not possi- 
ble t o  measure the rate  o r  importance of innovations by calculating 
their  frequency or by identifying the input and output characteristics of 
a particular innovation. Average efficiency coefficients, such a s  labor 
productivity, capital coefficients, or  the labor intensity of capital, a re  
unable to reflect t he  impact of innovation in a clear form. We also have 
to bear in mind tha t  the relative importance of t he  different input and 
output characteristics has changed during recent  years. 
Table 4 Implications a t  the company level of adopting either improvement or  
basic innovation strategies. 
Area of impact Implications of policy 
Lmprovement Basic technological change 
Marketing Demand relatively low, well- Demand high and relatively 
known, and predictable unpredictable 
Risk of failure low Risk of failure high 
Acceptance rapid Acceptance initially slow 
Well-known marketing New marketing system 
used necessary 
Production Existing labor, skills Existing labor, skills 
and patterns of cooperation and patterns of cooperation 
used to  a maximum becoming obsolete 
Significant risk in Problems of quality, costs, 
quality and process and effects new and unpredictable 
planning 
Research and Existing RBcD potential Advanced R&D potential 
development used needed 
Basic research not New research fields and 
needed disciplines needed 
R&D risk relatively R&D risk high and 
predictable unpredictable 
Management Familiar management systems New management skills 
used and we1.l-tried and organizational solutions 
organizational solutions needed 
adapted 
Society Unpredictable problems Legal and social acceptance 
relatively rare or unpredictable 
nonexistent 
To understand the  na ture  of the  innovation process, i t  is important 
t o  distinguish between two kinds of efficiency: 
1. Dyhamic eficiency: the efficiency of the particular production unit  
t h a t  has adopted the innovation, denoted by e ( i ) t .  
2. Average eficiency: the efficiency of t he  entire production field, 
denoted by E(t ). 
We then define the relative efficiency, z ( t ) ,  as  the  rat io of the dynamic to 
the  average efficiency 
e i t  
+(t)=%t) e  
The dominance of particular types of innovation (basic, improvement, or  
pseudo-innovation, t he  roles of product and process innovations, the 
sorts of barriers and stimuli typically encountered, and the  most 
appropriate management skills and tools all very much  depend on how 
widely the innovation has been adopted and how great  is the efficiency 
gap between the  innovating production uni t  and  the production field a s  a 
whole. With the help of t h e  relative eficiency coefficient we can under- 
s tand better the probable direction of developments in a company, an 
industry, or  a country. 
For the  innovation strategy of a firm or a country, two kinds of infor- 
mation are decisive: 
1. What is the position of t h e  production unit concerned in t h e  develop 
ment  of efficiency of t he  production field of which i t  is a part?  
2. Are options available to  improve or t o  maintain that  production 
unit's position in its own field, or should the  unit abandon the  pro- 
duction field altogether? 
To acquire such information we need to carefully investigate each 
different stage of t he  innovation cycle in order to  identify appropriate 
strategies of growth, change. and survival. I believe tha t  i t  is useful to 
distinguish the  following five stages in the  development of a production 
uni t  that  has  adopted a particular innovation: take-off, rapid growth, 
maturation, saturation, and  stagnation. 
Efforts are  underway to confirm our hypothesis about t h e  impor- 
tance  of different kinds of innovation with the help of empirical data. For 
the  purposes of this paper, our  findings concerning the "employment" 
and  "productivity" effects of different kinds of innovation a re  especially 
interesting. These two effects have been identified with the  help of data 
gathered by the Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, in 
Nurnberg, FRG. The data provide information on 2266 technological 
changes within 909 firms from four industrial branches (plastics, the 
metalwork industry, the  food industry, and the  wood and furniture indus- 
t ry)  in the FRG during the  period 1970-1973. By the  "employment" effect 
of innovation we mean here  the  ratio between the numbers of jobs 
created and eliminated as  a resul t  of technological change. The "produc- 
tivity" effect is t he  contribution of the  different lands of innovation to 
labor productivity growth a s  a result  of technological change. 
Figure 4 demonstrates t h a t  basic and major improvement innova- 
tions have t h e  highest employment effect, and  that  they a re  also respon- 
sible for a high contribution to productivity growth. Within these 
categories, the  implementation of new products had the highest single 
employment effect, creating 31.7 times more  new positions than i t  elim- 
inated. However, i ts contribution to labor productivity growth through 
technological change was a relatively low 2.4%. This is fairly typical in 
the  take-off stage of the  innovation cycle. The extension of innovations - 
a n  activity in t h e  rapid growth stage of the innovation cycle - contri- 
butes  significantly to labor productivity growth (29.6%) and also has a 
high employment effect (12.6 tirnes). Major improvenlents in the  quality 
of the product contribute 8.8% to labor productivity growth and create  
5.9 t imes more jobs than they eliminate. It is important t o  realize tha t  
Basic and major Improvement and incremental lncrememal 
improvement innovation and paudo- 
innovation innovation 
- Employment effect 
- Labor productivity effect 
Figure 4 The employment effect and the labor productivity effect of different 
kinds of innovation. ( I ,  implementation of new products; Ex, extension of capaci- 
ty; Q, new quality of products; C, cost reduction innovation; IE, improvement of 
efficiency; SL, reduction on shortage of labor; Ssp, reduction on shortage of 
space; Wc, improvement of working conditions; R, replacement of product equip- 
ment; SO, shortage of orders. 
basic innovation does both: it creates many more jobs than  any other  
type of technical change and i t  contributes significantly to  productivity 
growth. 
Improvement innovations devoted to cost reduction naturally pro- 
duce the  highest contribution to  labor productivity growth (49.8%), but 
they a re  also the starting point from which the  employment effect 
becomes negative. These innovations eliminate 1.4 times more jobs than  
they are able to  create.  Only in the case of improvements in workng 
conditions and production space does the employment effect become 
positive again, for obvious reasons. But in other  types of technical 
change associated with medium improvement and incremental innova- 
tion, which occur in the  fourth phase of the  innovation cycle (satura- 
tion), the employment and productivity effects a re  very low. For exam- 
ple, the short-term reaction to a shortage of workers has an employment 
effect of only -3.3 t imes and  a productivity effect of only 1.4%. 
This proves our hypothesis that  a low employment effect is not so 
much caused by the development of labor productivity - which is what 
some of our colleagues have claimed up to now - as by the dominance of 
medium improvement and incremental innovation (at the expense of 
basic innovation) in economic activities. This could also explain why, at  
the present time, some of the industrially developed market economies 
are faced w i t h  both a decline in productivity growth rates and high rates 
of unemployment. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from our mental model of 
the innovation cycle is that a high degree of efficiency and production 
output is no insurance against future problems caused by the emergence 
of new technological options. In fact, a production unit that  currently 
displays a very high degree of efficiency, a large market share, and a 
high degree of standardization and vertical integration may very well 
h d  i t  extremely difacult simultaneously to secure i t s  future economic 
vitality, to search for new ways of satisfying a latent demand, or to s u p  
ply an existing market  with better and less expensive alternatives. Clas- 
sic recent examples of sectors that have missed the right moment for 
change are the shipbuilding and steel industries. The main concern of 
the innovation policy makers of a country or a corporation should be to 
maintain the right mixture of business activities in the different stages 
of the innovation cycle. Countries or firms that  concentrate on innova- 
tion activities in the maturation or saturation stages will lose, in the 
foreseeable future, their advantages in terms of dynamic efficiency and 
will run into stagnation. 
One of the most important lessons from the management of innova- 
tion in all the industrialized countries is the necessity for close inter- 
dependence between government innovation policy and company stra- 
tegy Government actions to stimulate innovations have to take into 
account not only the  way that the attitudes of production units will vary 
as their emciency develops but also the adverse impacts on working con- 
ditions, environmental standards, and the health of the population that 
may arise from the application and diffusion of new technologies. On the 
other hand, the corporations themselves must improve their ability to 
find appropriate responses to national needs and foreseeable shortages, 
and to avoid not only primary but also secondary and tertiary adverse 
effects of the innovations they employ. This system of government- 
company interdependence is of major importance but is  still far from 
perfect. 
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Prof. Dr. Heinz-Dieter Haustein a t  IIASA and in the CDR. 
2. See for example Haustein and Maier (1980, 1984), Haustein et al. 
(1981). Maier (1982), Maier and Haustein (i980), Maier and Robinson 
(1982), and Roman and Puett (1983). 
3. "If the  social capital experiences a revolution in value, it may hap- 
pen that  the capital of the indvidual capitalist succumbs to it and 
fails, because it cannot adapt itself to the conditions of this move- 
ment of values. The more acute and frequent such revolutions in 
value become, the more does the automatic movement of the now 
independent value operate with the elemental force of a natural pro- 
cess, against the foresight and calculation of the  individual capital- 
ist ... and the greater is the danger tha t  threatens the  existence of 
the individual capitals." (Karl Marx, Cotpital, A Cri t ique  of Polit ical 
Economy ,  Vol. 11, Moscow, 1971, pp. 108,109.) 
Haustein, H.-D. and Maier, H. (1980) Basic, Improvement, and Pseudo 
Innovations and Their Impact on Efficiency. Technological Fbreccrst- 
zng and Social m a n g e ,  16: 243-265. 
Haustein, H.-D. and Maier, H. (1984) Innovat ion  a n d  Ef f i c i ency :  S r a t e g i e s  
f o r  a W r b u l e n t  World. Pergamon Press, London/Academy Publish- 
ing House, Berlin, forthcoming. 
Haustein, H.-D., Maier, H., and Uhlmann. L. (1981) h n o v a t i o n  and A"f,fk- 
c i e n c y .  RR-8 1-7. International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Maier, H. (1982) Innovation, Efficiency, and the  Quantitative and Qualita- 
tive Demand for Human Resources. lkchnological  f i r ecas t ing  and  
S c i a l  Change,  21: 15-31. 
Maier, H. and Haustein, H.-D. (1980) Innovation, Efficiency Cycle and 
Strategy Implications. Technologicd  Forecast ing a n d  Social Change. 
17: 35-39. 
Maier, H. and Robinson, J. (Eds.) (1982) h n o v a t i o n  Po l i c y  a n d  Company  
B a t e g y .  CP-82-S9. International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Roman, D.D. and Puett, J.F., Jr. (1983) Internat ional  M n e s s  and  Tech- 
nological  h n o v a t i o n .  Elsevier, Amsterdam and New York. 
